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Courts are only as good as thepeople sitting on the bench. This is true for
national as well as international courts, with the caveat that the legal
oﬃcers/clerks of national supreme or international courts may to some
extent compensate for the limited competence of the judges they work
for. This does not mean, though, that the qualiﬁcation of the judges
should in any way be compromized by political considerations. Unfor-
tunately, as everyone with some experience in the national or interna-
tional judiciary knows, the reality is diﬀerent. Take for example the case
of Germany, a consolidated democracy with a high regard for its judi-
ciary and jurisprudence, where, however, party aﬃliation is an impor-
tant, sometimes indispensable requirement to become a supreme or
constitutional court judge or Federal Prosecutor-General.1 As the
Spanish example shows, at least formal party aﬃliation could be
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1 For an empirical study seeM. Bohlander and C. Latour,The German Judiciary in the
Nineties – A Study of the Recruitment, Promotion and Remuneration of German Judges
(Shaker Aachen, 1998) 45, concluding that there exists a rather sinister picture of the
inﬂuence political parties exert over the elections to the BGH [German Supreme
Court]…’’.
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prohibited for judges.2 In any case, if (party) politics inﬂuences the
election of judges to the supreme courts on the national level, what then
what can we realistically expect from the international judiciary?
The present study provides a quite disillusioning answer to this
question. The book starts with a presentation of the historic context
of the ICJ and ICC,3 then explains their composition (24 et seq.), the
domestic process of nomination (63 et seq.), the electoral process (100
et seq.) and it ﬁnally explains some trends and develops reform
proposals (137 et seq.). The results of the study are based on an
innovative quantitative and qualitative analysis of the nomination
and election processes of international courts, focusing on the In-
ternational Court of Justice (ICJ) and the International Criminal
Court (ICC). The qualitative and quantitative data was gathered in a
three-step process: (1) a questionnaire on national nomination pro-
cesses distributed to a wide range of international judicial, legal and
governmental actors; (2) interviews with staﬀ members of the Per-
manent Missions to the UN in New York; (3) nine country case
studies in diﬀerent regions of the world, including interviews with key
actors. With this approach the study provides, for the ﬁrst time solid
empirical, albeit not completely representative, data on the important
question of the selection of international judges.
The disillusioning conclusions of the study can be summarized in
one sentence: the nomination and election processes of the interna-
tional courts, especially the ICJ and ICC, are characterized by a high
degree of politicization, a lack of transparency and a lack of mini-
mum standards which would guarantee a minimum qualiﬁcation of
the judges so elected. Professor Cesare Romano, the general editor
of the series, refers quite bluntly in his preface to a ‘‘troubling lack of
transparency and the absence of common or minimum standards in
the process (…) the endemic and almost total absence of public
scrutiny or political accountability that raises alarm bells.’’4 In the
words of the authors the criticism sounds like this:
2 Article 395 of the Spanish Law of the Organization of the Judiciary (Ley
Organica del Poder Judicial) provides that judges must not belong to political parties
or trade unions or work for these (No podra´n los jueces o magistrados pertenecer a
partidos polı´ticos o sindicatos o tener empleo al servicio de los mismos …’). Some
criticize, however, that this rule is partly undermined by the Associations of Judges
which are close to the political parties (Asociacio´n Profesional de la Magistratura’ of
a conservative tendency and Jueces para la Democracı´a’ of a left-wing orientation).
3 Ruth Mackenzie, Kate Malleson, Penny Martin, and Phillipe Sands, Selecting
International Judges. Principle, Process, and Politics (Oxford: OUP, 2010), 7ﬀ.
4 Ibid., Section 9
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Evidence of politicization is apparent at both the nomination and election stages.
For both courts, nomination practices are fragmented, lacking in transparency, and
highly varied. At one end of the spectrum, a few candidates emerge following a
transparent and formal consultative process that focuses on merit; at the other end, it
is not unusual for individuals to be selected as a result of overtly political consid-
erations or even nepotism. Whatever form of nomination process is adopted, all
nominated candidates must work their way through a highly politicized election
process.5
With these results, the study generally backs up critical views in the
literature on the issue at hand.6
The study’s results are equally disappointing for all those (includ-
ing this author) who had believed or hoped that the formally stricter
ICC selection rules would ensure a better selection. After all, the ICC
Statute does not only require, as does the ICJ Statute, that the can-
didates shall be of ‘‘high moral character, impartiality and integrity’’
and ‘‘possess the qualiﬁcations of their national law for appointment
to the highest judicial oﬃces’’ (Article 36 (3)(a) ICC-Statute; Article 2
ICJ Statute). It demands further that they ‘‘have established compe-
tence in criminal law and procedure, and the necessary relevant
experience, whether as judge, prosecutor, advocate or in other similar
capacity, in criminal proceedings’’ (Article 36 (3)(b)(i) ICC Statute) or
‘‘competence in relevant areas of international law such as interna-
tional humanitarian law and the law of human rights, and extensive
experience in a professional legal capacity which is of relevance to the
judicial work of the Court’’ (Article 36 (3)(b)(ii) ICC Statute) and
‘‘have an excellent knowledge of and be ﬂuent in at least one of the
working languages of the Court’’, i.e., English or French (Article 36
(3)(c) ICC Statute). In addition, the Assembly of States Parties (see
5 Ibid., 173.
6 D. Terris, C. P. R. Romano and L. Swigart, The International Judge: An
Introduction to the Man and Woman Who Decide the World´s Cases (Oxford, OUP,
2007); M. Bohlander, Pride and Prejudice or Sense and Sensibility? A Pragmatic
Proposal for the Recruitment of Judges at the ICC and Other International Criminal
Courts,’ (2009) 12 New Criminal Law Review 4, 529, arguing in particular that
diplomats, government oﬃcial and academics are not suited for judicial tasks since
they lack practical experience which, in turn, should be the main reason to recruit
practitioners (on the merits of ‘‘academia’’, cf. Mackenzie et al., (n. 3), 52–53). The
former US Federal and ICTY Judge P.M. Wald also calls for better qualiﬁed judges,
Women on International Courts: Some Lessons Learned,’ (2011) 11 International
Criminal Law Review 3, 401–408, criticizing that ‘‘judges were appointed who had
neither any prior experience nor even much knowledge about the criminal law
process.’’.
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Article 112 ICC Statute) on 10 September 2004 adopted a resolution
on the ‘‘Procedure for the Nomination and Election of Judges of the
International Criminal Court’’7 which contains quite precise rules for
the nomination and election of the judges.
Yet, notwithstanding these formal diﬀerences between the ICJ and
ICC selection procedures explicitly acknowledged in the study,8 the
authors reach the conclusion that the selection procedures of both
courts are ‘‘in very broad terms the same’’9 and they doubt ‘‘whether
the ICC approach has led to any overall improvement in the make-up
of the bench’’.10 As to the nomination procedure, the authors criticize
with respect to the ICJ that ‘‘most states studied do not act in
accordance with the spirit, and at times not even the letter, of the ICJ
Statute’’.11 This also applies to the ICC nomination practice, as far as
it follows the ICJ model, via the national groups of the Permanent
Court of Arbitration (Article 4 (1) ICJ Statute). With regard to ICC
nominations through national procedures however,
(…) the picture is even more confused and it is often unclear what, if any, process is
being followed. The result is a fragmented, inconsistent and highly variable approach
to ICJ and ICC nominations. Some candidates may be selected through a trans-
parent and consultative process that focuses on merit, whilst their competitors may
have emerged because they were the best friend of the minister, or they were the
minister him or herself.12
At the end of the day, this means that the candidates’ merit is
often a secondary factor and that States Parties have not succeeded in
reaching a more objective, rational and less politicized ICC nomi-
nation and election procedure. To be sure, ‘‘soft factors’’ such as a
more or less equal geographical representation of all parts of the
world on the bench13 and the gender aspect, must certainly be taken
into account in international courts. Yet the qualiﬁcation of the
7 Mackenzie et al., (n. 3), 197ﬀ.
8 See 187 et seq. and especially at 174: ‘‘In form (…) these requirements appear to
be strikingly diﬀerent.’’.




13 Ibid., 175, although this may entail a particularly strong link to speciﬁc state
interests (‘‘selecting ambassadors’’ at 60). See further, P. McAuliﬀe, Review,’ (2011)
11 International Criminal Law Review 359, 361 ‘‘(…) universal acceptance of the
utility of the general principle of geographical representation’’.
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candidates should never be compromised and ‘‘talented outsiders’’
should also have the possibility of getting nominated and elected.
After all, the world courts (ICJ and ICC), unlike the European
regional courts14 are under no obligation to have judges from all
states parties on the bench.15
In sum, the study clearly demonstrates that improvements in the
selection procedures and practice are indispensable. The authors quote
the Burgh House Principles on the Independence of the International
Judiciary’ which provide for certainminimum conditionswhich should
form the basis of the selection of international judges.16 Furthermore,
the transparency and accountability of the nomination and election
procedure is of the utmost importance. In this regard the NGO,
Coalition for the ICC,makes an important contributionpresenting and
screening the ICC candidates.17 In addition, a presentation and
examination of the candidates in a more formal setting, similar to the
procedure used with regard to candidates to the US Supreme Court,
would be desirable. This could occur for example before the (still not
established!) Advisory Committee on Nominations’ of the ASP
(Article 36 (4)(c) ICC Statute). Given the strong politicization of the
national nomination procedures a quality control can occur only at the
14 European Court of Human Rights, Article. 20, 22 Eur. Conve. of Human
Rights; EU–Court, Article 19(2) cl. 1 EU–Treaty.
15 On the contrary, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights is only composed
of seven judges (Article 52 American Convention of Human Rights) to be selected
from the 25 state parties, http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/sigs/b-32.html, ac-
cessed 5 March 2012.
16 The principles, reprinted in Mackenzie et al., (n. 3), 178, deserve to be quoted:
‘‘2.1 In accordance with the governing instruments, judges shall be chosen from
among persons of high moral character, integrity and conscientiousness, who possess
the appropriate professional qualiﬁcations, competence and experience required for
the court concerned. 2.2 While procedures for nomination, election and appointment
should consider fair representation of diﬀerent geographic regions and the principal
legal systems, as appropriate, as well as of female and male judges, appropriate
personal and professional qualiﬁcations must be overriding considerations in the
nomination, election and appointment of judges. 2.3 Procedures for the nomination,
election and appointment of judges should be transparent and provide appropriate
safeguards against nominations, elections and appointments motivated by improper
considerations. 2.4 Information regarding the nomination, election and appointment
process and information about candidates for judicial oﬃce should be made public,
in due time and in an eﬀective manner, by the international organization or other
body responsible for the nomination, election and appointment process.’’.
17 http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=electionjudges, accessed 5 March 2012 referring
to http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ASP/Elections/Judges/2011/Alphabetical+listing-
2011.htm, accessed 5 March 2012.
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international level via the nomination and election procedures of the
international courts themselves. Such hearings can be most helpful
since they might at least prevent the least qualiﬁed candidates from
becoming judges. In any event, it is clear that the legitimacy of the
international courts depends to a large degree on the legitimacy of the
selection procedure and the quality of their judges.18 For this reason
one can only wholeheartedly support the authors when they demand
‘‘urgent steps (…) to limit the growing and pervasive role of extraneous
political factors in order to ensure that politics does not overwhelm the
prospects for selecting the very best judges for the international
courts’’.19
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Cre-
ative Commons Attribution License which permits any use, distri-
bution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original
author(s) and the source are credited.
18 See the foreword of Lord Woolf, at Ch. VIII in Mackenzie et al., n. 3.; ‘‘The
legitimacy of the court will be damaged or even destroyed if it is perceived that the court´s
membership is largely the product of political bargaining between the states which are
subject to the jurisdiction of the court’’.;M. Swart, Review,’ (2011) 24 Leiden Journal of
International Law 789, 792, ‘‘The importance of judicial selection cannot be overesti-
mated. It couldbe said that the legitimacyof the entire systemof international justice is at
stake’’.;Fromagender-perspective.N.Grossman, SexRepresentationontheBenchand
the Legitimacy of International Criminal Courts,’ (2011) 11 International Criminal Law
Review 643 argues that the under-representation of women judges undercuts the legiti-
macy of the courts ‘‘because men and women bring diﬀerent perspectives to judging.
Consequently, without both sexes, adjudication is inherently biased’’.
19 Mackenzie et al., n. 3, 179.
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